Simulazione ad agenti e teoria della cooperazione. Il ruolo della sanzione

Punishment plays a crucial role in achieving and maintaining norm compliance. Several experimental works have shown that cooperation greatly increases when punishment opportunities are allowed. However, these studies have mainly looked at punishment from the classical economic perspective, as a way of changing people's conduct by increasing the cost of undesired behaviour. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, by punishment we refer to a practice that works only by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself. The results obtained through agent-based simulation show us that sanction is more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden than mere punishment.

Tipo Pubblicazione: 
Articolo
Author or Creator: 
Andrighetto, Giulia
Villatoro, Daniel
Cecconi, Federico
Conte, Rosaria
Publisher: 
Società Editrice il Mulino, Bologna , Italia
Source: 
Sistemi intelligenti (Testo stamp.) 23 (2011): 367–376. doi:10.1422/35363
info:cnr-pdr/source/autori:Andrighetto, Giulia ; Villatoro, Daniel ; Cecconi, Federico ; Conte, Rosaria/titolo:Simulazione ad agenti e teoria della cooperazione. Il ruolo della sanzione/doi:10.1422/35363/rivista:Sistemi intelligenti (Testo stamp.)/anno:2
Date: 
2011
Resource Identifier: 
http://www.cnr.it/prodotto/i/204768
https://dx.doi.org/10.1422/35363
info:doi:10.1422/35363
http://www.mulino.it/rivisteweb/scheda_articolo.php?id_articolo=35363&from=%2Fws%2FrwDirectDownload.php%3Fdoi%3D10.1422%2F35363
Language: 
Ita
ISTC Author: 
Ritratto di rosaria.conte
Real name: 
Ritratto di Federico Cecconi
Real name: