Dynamic Sanctioning for Robust and Cost-Efficient Norm Compliance

As explained by Axelrod in his seminal work
An
Evolutionary Approach to Norms
, punishment is a
key mechanism to achieve the necessary social con-
trol and to impose social norms in a self-regulated
society. In this paper, we distinguish between two
enforcing mechanisms. i.e.
punishment
and
sanc-
tion
, focusing on the specific ways in which they fa-
vor the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
The key research question is to find more stable
and cheaper mechanisms for norm compliance in
hybrid social environments (populated by humans
and computational agents). To achieve this task, we
have developed a normative agent able to punish
and sanction defectors and to dynamically choose
the right amount of punishment and sanction to
impose on them (
Dynamic Adaptation Heuristic
).
The results obtained through agent-based simula-
tion show us that sanction is more effective and
less costly than punishment in the achievement and
maintenance of cooperation and it makes the pop-
ulation more resilient to sudden changes than if it
were enforced only by mere pu

Publication type: 
Contributo in atti di convegno
Author or Creator: 
Villatoro, Daniel
Andrighetto, Giulia
Sabater-Mir, Jordi
Conte, Rosaria
Publisher: 
AAAI Press, Menlo Park [CA], USA
Source: 
IJCAI, pp. 414–419, Barcellona, -
Date: 
2011
Resource Identifier: 
http://www.cnr.it/prodotto/i/93755
https://dx.doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-077
info:doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-077
urn:isbn:978-1-57735-513-7
Language: 
Eng
ISTC Author: 
rosaria.conte's picture
Real name: 
Giulia Andrighetto's picture
Real name: