The COM Perspective on Intentional Agents

The main goal of this paper is a preliminary characterization of the categories of the mental, able to fit andintegratethefoundationalontologyD O L C E(a Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering); we will call this core ontology COM (Computational Ontology of Mind).
TheideaofC O Memergesfromtheneedofaconceptual clarification from the standpoint of formal ontology of the entities that play a role in agent technologies for information systems. Based on philosophical tradition, we have singled out a central relation in the realm of the mental: aboutness. In our proposal aboutness connects a mental state with a mental object, at a certain time, and with respect to a given intentional agent. Furthermore, we envisage a generalization of this framework to mental processes and events.
Thus, in the paper we will give a first analysis of these entities, mainly focused on mental objects and their characteristics. We are also specifying the basic features of mental states and intentional agents, exploiting ontological categories and relations implemented in DOLCE.
"We exist, as the thinking things we are, only thanks to a baffling dance of brains, bodies, cultural and technological scaffolding" [1].